Despite the efforts of the Gracchi...

'Despite the efforts of the Gracchi, the problems they attempted to solve largely remained after their deaths.' Discuss this statement

Given the required brevity of this essay, it seems appropriate to concentrate on the most important of the reforms attempted by the Gracchi; the so called lex agraria. To this end I shall begin by discussing the lex agraria itself, and then examining why it did not achieve its desired outcome and why the Gracchi ultimately failed.

During the middle of the second century,  Rome had been embroiled in a series of prolonged foreign campaigns. During this time, vast amounts of land had been amassed in the hands of a very few wealthy landlords (Plutarch Ti. Gr. 8; cf. Shochat, 1980, 89.). This decimated the class of small farmers, who were the backbone of the legions. These wealthy elites had also largely chosen to farm their land with slaves rather than employing citizens, resulting in the flooding of Rome with large numbers of poor citizens, below the property qualification for military service. Tiberius’ lex agraria was directly intended to solve this social inequality, whilst also alleviating the military recruitment problems (Appian, Civil War, 1.8-9) stemming from too few citizens qualifying.

The bill stated that all citizens were allowed to own a maximum of 500 iugera (Appian, Civil Wars 1.1.9-2.16; cf. Scullard, 1959, 25) of ager publicus. The rest was to be taken by the state and redistributed among the landless poor (Cary & Scullard, 1935, 204), perhaps in batches of around 30 iugera (Plutarch, Ti. Gr. 9.2). In the short term, the bill looks to have been ‘in the interests of Rome’ (more later); but it was not without peril for Tiberius (His life was put at risk late in his tribunate; Plutarch, Ti. Gr. 13.16).

The bill met obvious opposition; many of the wealthy landlords who had most to lose, were, or course, senators. Tiberius was not without friends in the senate, however, there is no doubt that some would have voted against it on the grounds of personal opposition to Tiberius, or of self interest; but, we may assume that if he were to have brought the bill to the senate, some of his supporters may have felt that it was indeed in the best interests of the state and voted with him (Scullard, 1959, 26; cf. Cary & Scullard, 1935, 204). Evidently Tiberius had little faith in the senate: he took the bill straight to the people; following, as noted by Plutarch (Ti. Gr. 8), a hundred-year-old precedent.

The senate was, evidently, not prepared to acquiesce in this blatant disregard of their traditional rights. Tiberius’ fellow tribune, M. Octavius vetoed the bill (Scullard, 1959, 26), supposedly in the interests of the senate. Tiberius reacted with anger, reintroducing the bill with fewer concessions to the wealthy, and by having Octavius removed from office (Cary & Scullard, 1935, 205). Tiberius also proposed to use the revenues from the newly acquired territory of Asia to fund the bill. Badian (1972, 697-701; 709-710) supports the action taken by Tiberius here, arguing that the truly unconstitutional act, opposing custom (mos maiorum), was Octavius’ vetoing of the popular assembly. Thus, one may accept that Tiberius’ deposition of a fellow tribune was justifiable; a novel response to an unprecedented problem. Of more dubious legality, however, was Tiberius’ seizing of Attalus’ wealth  (Plutarch, Ti. Gr. 8.7-11) to fund his redistribution program (Badian 1972, 713). Both finance and foreign policy had been traditionally the reserve of the senate.

Following the murder of Tiberius (Appian, Civil Wars, 1.2.16), his younger brother Gaius continued Tiberius’ reforms (Appian, Civil Wars 1.22): Introducing new measures to subsidise corn imports, building roads (Plutarch, Ga. Gr. 3) and founding of new colonies (Scullard, 1959, 33); a program that was, again, popular with the plebeians and ‘good for Rome’.

If intended as a contribution to military reform, the lex agriana was entirely inadequate as long as the state continued o conduct prolonged foreign campaigns (Cary & Sculard, 1935, 204). As a means of reducing the amount of ager publicus in the hands of a small number of wealthy land owners, and redistributing land to poor citizens, it was to have a little more success: but as long as they were constantly liable to be drawn away from their land for military service, or lured by the attractions of Rome, then the bill could be of limited value.

Rome traditionally had three safeguards against tyranny, the senate, the annual succession of tribunes and the collegiality principle; Tiberius heavy handedness was a perceived threat to all three (Badian, 1972, 722), and this was, ultimately why he was murdered by a group of fellow senators.

Despite many of the social and economic problems faced by Rome in the latter half of the second century, the Gracchi do appear to have achieved some lasting results and thus to have been some benefit to Rome. The difficulties that remained after their deaths were relieved if not removed; colonies were sent out and the poor were allocated allotments of land. Despite the benefit to those occupying the lowest levels on the social ladder, those further up were less than pleased with the Gracchan reforms. Rome’s Italian allies were embittered, the equites were more aware of their power in the political arena, and the people had had a taste of real democracy and the potential weakness of the senate was revealed for all to see (Scullard, 1959, 38). This challenge to the traditional governmental system of Rome was severe, since the Concilium Plebis was in no position to form a governmental structure itself.

The statement set out in the question, therefore, seems to be entirely justified; The Gracchi should be commended, with hindsight, with at least attempting to solve the social and economic problems they encountered, but we should recognise that, in many ways, the problems did indeed remain after they died.